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ADmINISTRATIVE LAW-JuDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DETEnlmNA-
TiONS.-The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, under the authority of
U. S. Rev. Stat. (1919) § 3220, U. S. Comp. Stat. (1923 Supp.) § 59.14,
refunded certain excise tax payments made by the defendant corporation on
its manufactures. Subsequently, the Commissioner ruled that the goods
were properly subject to taxation. In an action by the government to re-
cover the amount of the tax, judgment was rendered for the defendant.
United States v. Detroit Steel Products Co., 20 F. (2d) G75 (S. D. Mich.
1927).
It has generally been held that the determinations of the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, wheh made under his statutory authority, are con-
clusive. United States v.:Kaufnzan, 96 U. S. 567 (1877) (allowance of
commissioner not reviewable); Cohen v. Edwards, 256 Fed. 964 (S. D. N. Y.
1919) (no collateral attack on finding of fact); Penrose v. Skinner, 293
Fed. 335 (D. Colo. 1923) (determination of commissioner binding on both
his successors and court) ;) see Pillsbury, Admiaistrative Tribunals (1923)
36 HARv. L. Rnv. 405, 413-415. But this does not prevent an attack on the
decision based on an allegation of fraud or lack of jurisdiction. See Dugan
v. U. S., 34 Ct. Cls. 458, 466 (1899) ; Albertsworth, Judicial Rcviczv of Ad-
ministrative Action (1921) 35 HARV. L. REV. 127, 151; Holmes, Federal
Taxation (6th ed. 1925) § 915; cf. Sclool v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94, 23
Sup. Ct. 33 (1902) (Postmaster-General-determination of question of law
reviewable on appeal). The same rule is applicable to the determinations
of other administrative officers. United States jr. Babcock, 250 U. S. 328,
39 Sup. Ct. 464 (1919) (claims before Treasury Dep't); United States. v.
Hitchcock, 190 U. S. 316, 23 Sup. Ct.. 698 (1903) (Secretary of Interior,
public lands); Ektze v. United States, 142 U. S. 651, 12 Sup. Ct. 33G (1892)
(immigration); United States v. Black, 128 U. S. 40, 9 Sup. Ct. 12 (1883)
(pension); Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106, 24 Sup. Ct. 595
(1904) (Postmaster-General, specific claim); cf. Gonzales v1. Williams, 192
U. S. 1, 24 Sup. Ct. 177 (104) (immigration, jurisdictional matter review-
able); see (1923) 32 YAL LAW JOURNAL 735; Grimm, Administrative De-
terminations (1919) 3 ST. Louis L. Rnv. 140; Note (1927) 25 MiCu. L. RGu.
288. The justification for this rule lies in the better adaptability of ad-
ministrative tribunals for such hearings and the consequent relief to al-
ready crowded trial dockets. See Note (1927) 27 COL. L. RBv. 450, 452;
Pillsbury, op. cit. supra, at 591-2. Another ground upon which the instant
decision is based is the rule barring recovery of taxes voluntarily paid.
Chesebrough v. United States, 192 U. S. 253, 24 Sup. Ct. 2G2 (1904) ; Foz
v. Edwards, 287 Fed. 669 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923); Proctor & Gamzble Co. v.
United States, 281 Fed. 1014 (S. D. Ohio, 1922); See 3 Cooley, Taxation
(4th ed. 1924) § 1282. It has been pointed out that there is a tendency to
abrogate this rule. See Note (1926) 12 VA. L. REV. 433. And several dicta
criticize, as having no foundation in policy, the requirement that taxes be
paid under protest as a prerequisite to refund. See People v. Harerstraw,
126 App. Div. 414, 419, 110 N. Y. Supp. 769, 773 (2d Dept. 1903); Hotel
Richmond v. Commonwealth, 118 Va. 607, 611, 88 S. E. 173, 174 (1916).
Most of the inroads upon the rule have been in cases involving statutea
-which authorize the refund without mentioning the manner of payment.
Cf. Stewart Co. v. Alameda County, 142 Cal. 60, 76 Pac. 481 (1904);
see Rand v. United States, 249 U. S. 503, 508, 39 Sup. Ct. 359, 360 (1919).
Moreover, the doctrine seems hitherto to have been restricted to suits
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brought by a taxpayer for recovery of taxes. Any extension to make it
applicable to refunds made by a tax commissioner would seem unwarranted.
ALIENS-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SECTION OF NATURALIZATION ACT HELD
MANDATORY.-Section 4 of the Naturalization Act of 1906 [U. S. Comp.
Stat. (1916) § 4352] requires that the applicant's certificate of arrival and
petition for citizenship be filed concurrently.' Appellee was permitted to file
his certificate of arrival twenty days after filing his petition for citizenship,
it being entered nune pro tune. The government petitioned to cancel ap-
pellee's certificate of citizenship on the ground that failure to comply with
Section 4 was a jurisdictional defect. The district court dismissed the peti-
tion. Held, on appeal (one judge dissenting), that the decree be reversed,
since strict compliance with Section 4 is necessary. United States v. Mancy,
21 F. (2d) 28 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927).
Strict compliance with the terms of a tax statute is required in situations
where a variance therefrom endangers one's ownership in land. lWornack
v. Central Lumber Co., 131 Miss. 201, 94 So. 2 (1922) (statute requiring
land to be sold in prescribed manner to satisfy delinquent taxes); Cook v.
Vincent, 111 Okla. 95, 238 Pac. 471 (1925) (failure to publish notice for
the statutory period avoided a tax sale). Otherwise if the variation would
not have such an effect. Thomas v. Chapin, 116 Mo. 396, 22 S. W. 785
(1893) (binding of assessment roll in two volumes contrary to statute did
not avoid a levy on personalty). Deviations from the copyright law
are immaterial when no general injury to the public is occasioned. Wire-
back v. Campbell, 261 Fed. 391 (W. D. Md. 1919) (requirement that appli-
cant for copyright set forth his citizenship not mandatory). But courts
strictly enforce requirements as to the publication of notice of the copy-
right, since such publication is a prerequisite to a suit for infringement.
Louis De Jonge & Co. v. Breuker, 182 Fed. 150 (S. E. D. Pa. 1910 ) (one
notice on a sheet containing several reproductions of a painting insufficient,
statute requiring one on each). Election statutes are liberally construed
unless a variance from the prescribed mode affects the merits of the elec-
tion. State v. Hackman, 273 Mo. 670, 202 S. W. 7 (1918) (janitor deliver-
ing ballot boxes instead of city clerk immaterial) ; State v. Superior Court,
140 Wash. 636, 250 Pac. 66 (1926) (statute requiring 30 days notice of
special election mandatory). And also statutes affecting only the proce-
dural part of a task. Cline v. Cline, 198 Ky. 585, 249 S. W. 348 (1923)
(failure to file transcript with court clerk by statutory date not fatal);
Emhardt v. Schroeder, 155 U. S. 124 (1894) (likewise as to customs offi-
cer's failure to follow statutory mode of examining goods); In Re Stein,
105 Fed. 749 (C. C. A. 2d, 1901) (statutory mode of securing service of
process in'bankruptcy proceeding not mandatory). It seems then, that
strict compliance with statutes requiring affirmative action is indispensible
only in cases where its absence would jeopardize the interests of others or
tend to defeat the purpose of the statute. See, Sedgvick, Statutory and
Constitutional Law (1857) 229 et seq., 291, 294. And this is true with
respect to the naturalization law.' United States v. Stoller, 180 Fed. 910
(E. D. Wash. 1910) (requirement that applicant's petition be filed in
duplicate not mandatory); In Re Denny, 240 Fed. 845 (S. D. N. Y. 1917)
(likewise as to requirement that name of applicant's former sovereign ap-
pear in his declaration of intention). Section 4 was designed to disclose
sources of evidence regarding applicant's arrival, as it can hardly be as-
sumed that it is a trap set for the unwary alien. A variation from its
terms would not affect the value of the evidence disclosed. Cf. In Re Pick,
209 Fed. 999 (E. D. N. Y. 1913) (original certificate not required); In Re
Page, 206 Fed. 1004 (E. D. Mich. 1913) (need not be based on information
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received at port of arrival). Neither would an abbreviation in the period
allotted the government for investigation result, since, as the dissenting
opinion suggested, the court could extend it. Nor would the public appear
to be adversely affected if the applicant were otherwise eligible. The in-
stant court appears to have insisted too strongly on a mere formality.
BANKRUPTcY-LIENS UPoN EXEMPT PROPERTY--JUI5SDICT1ON Or THE
BANKRUPTCY CouRir.An attachment was levied on a debtor's land before
it was appropriated as a homestead and within four months of bankruptcy.
In the bankruptcy proceedings which followed, the land was set aside as
exempt. The referee then permitted the trustee in bankruptcy to become a
party to the suit for which the attachment issued, for the benefit of all the
creditors. Held, that this was error since the lien, even if valid, was out-
side the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. In re Rabb, 21 F. (2d) 254
(N. D. Tex. 1927).
It was finally considered settled that under § 67f of the Bankruptcy Act
a discharge in bankruptcy discharged liens acquired by legal proceedings
within four months of bankruptcy on exempt property. Chicago, Burlington
& Quincy R. R. Co. v. Hall, 229 U. S. 511, 33 Sup. Ct. 885 (1913) ; Booth v.
Bates, 215 Ala. 613, 112 So. 209 (1927); Remington, Banhrziptcy (3d ed.
1923) § 1359. But liens created by contract upon the exempt property
are not discharged, unless preferential under § 60 (a) and (b). Bank of
Mendon v. Mell, 185 Mo. App. 510, 172 S. WV. 484 (1915) (mortgage given
on exempt property within four months of bankruptcy) ; Schwanz v. Farm-
ers' Co-op. Co. of Lorimor, 214 N. W. 491 (Iowa, 1927) ; Pace v. Berry, 176
Ky. 61, 195 S. W. 131 (1917). Likewise where a judgment is acquired on
an instrument which expressly waived exemptions. See Chicago, Burling-
ton & Quincy R. R. v. Hall, supra, at 516. But a debt evidenced by exemp-
tion waiver notes not reduced to judgment does not survive the discharge
in bankruptcy. Joyner v. Bant of Menlo, 156 Ga. 750, 120 S. E. 4 (1923).
Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court may withhold the discharge for a reason-
able time to permit the creditor to secure a judgment lien which will not
be avoided by the discharge. Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190 U. S. 294,
23 Sup. Ct. 751 (1903); In re Maynard, 183 Fed. 323 (N. D. Ga. 1910).
And it has even been held proper for the trustee to withhold the exemp-
tions to permit garnishment proceedings against him in a state court. In
re Solomon, 294 Fed. 295 (E. D. Ala. 1923). In Texas the homestead exemp-
tion exists from the date of its designation. Heady v. Behar Bldg. Ass'n,
26 S. W. 468 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894). And liens acquired on the premises
before such designation are superior to homestead rights later acquired.
Brooks v. Chatham, 57 Tex. 31 (1382). Therefore, it is preserved against
a discharge in bankruptcy. In re Malone's Estate, 228 Fed. 566 (E. D.
Idaho, 1915) (and may be administered by the bankruptcy court). And it
would seem that such lien should be preserved only for the lienor, and not
for the estate. Cf. American Trust & Savings Bank v. Duncan, 254 Fed.
780 (C. C. A. 5th, 1918); In re Moore, 11 F. (2d) 62 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926);
(1927) 36 YALE LAW JOURNqL 417. Assuming the validity of this lien, it is
generally held that the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court over exempt
property is limited to segregating and setting it aside for the benefit of
the bankrupt. It has no power to determine claims against the exempt
property. In re Hatch, 102 Fed. 280 (S. D. Iowa 1900); Woodruff v.
Cheeves, 105 Fed. 601 (C. C. A. 5th, 1901) ; Peyton v. Farmera' Nat. Bank,
261 Fed. 326 (C. C. A. 5th, 1919) ; Birmingham F inance Co. r. Cl&iholm,
284 Fed. 840 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922); Eckhardt v. Hess, 200 Iowa 1308, 206
N. W. 291 (1925). A very few states hold that the equitable jurisdiction
of the bankruptcy court includes the privilege of administering the exempt
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property in behalf of valid claims. Brooks v. Britt-Carson Shoe Co., 133
Ga. 191, 65 S. E. 411 (1909); In re Malone's Estate, supra. The instant
decision is clearly in line with the greatly prevailing view that a claim
against exempt property, not extinguished by the discharge in bankruptcy,
is outside the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.
BILLS AND NOTES-PRESENTIENT FOn PAYMENT By TELEPHONE.-Tho
plaintiff was the holder of a negotiable note payable at the maker's office.
On the day of its maturity a notary, on behalf of the holder, telephoned
the office of the maker corporation and asked for an officer by name, mak-
ing demand for payment. The reply was that the officer was not there.
In an action against the indorser, the trial court gave judgment for the
plaintiff. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be reversed since this was
an insufficient presentment to charge the indorser. Robinson v. Lancaster
Foundry Co., 136 Atl. 58 (Md. 1927).
The same result has been reached when the maker himself answered the
telephone and refused payment. Gilpin v. Savage, 201 N. Y. 167, 94 N. E.
656 (1911). Section 74 of the N. I. L. requires the instrument to be ex-
hibited to the person from whom payment is demanded. But when there
is a refusal to pay on other grounds, the courts disregard this requirement.
Lockwood v. Crawford, 18 Conn. 361 (1847); Porter v. Thom, 40 App. Div.
34, 57 N. Y. Supp. 479 (2d Dept. 1899) (note in the possession of the
holder at the time). Some courts do not insist that the holder have the
note in his possession under these circumstances. Freudenberg v. Lucas, 38
Cal. App. 95, 175 Pac. 482 (1918); Porter v. East Jordan Realty Co., 210
Mich. 398, 177 N. W. 987 (1920). Contra: Reichert v. McQuade, 217 App.
Div. 779, 216 N. Y. Supp. 729 (2d Dept. 1926). Thus it seems that a
demand upon the proper party, on a proper day, with an unqualified refusal
by him to pay, will constitute a presentment. Cf. King v. Crowell, 61 le.
244 (1873) (presentment on street with demand but no exhibition held
sufficient). It is possible that the fact of due demand is more easily
proved if accompanied by the physical presence of the holder. And the
indorser would be prejudiced if the maker is more likely to refuse payment
over the telephone than when confronted by the holder. Thus, a sanction
of presentment by telephone might tend to increase litigation. But unless
these considerations outweigh the increased facility in collection attendant
upon an adoption of the contrary rule, the result in the Gilpin Case seems
undesirable. In the absence of the maker, a presentment to anyone at the
place where an instrument is payable is good under sections 72 (4) and 73
(1) of the N. I. L. The instant case may be supported since, even if a
personal demand had been made, it does not appear that all the proper
officers of the maker corporation were absent or inaccessible. Cf. Simmons
v. Poole, 227 Mass. 29, 116 N. E. 227 (1917).
CiHARITIES-DEvISE TO UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION INVALiD,-The test-
atrix devised part of her real estate to an unincorporated charitable associ-
ation, which was related to a charitable corporation, of which the unin-
corporated association was an auxiliary, if not a branch. In a suit for par-
tition of the estate, held, that the attempted devise was invalid, on the
ground that an unincorporated association is incapable of taking property
by devise. Fisher v. Lister, 223 N. Y. Supp. 321 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
The common law rule that an unincorporated association is not a capable
grantee under a deed or devise still prevails. Donthitt v. Stinson, 63 lo.
268 (1876); East Haddam Church v. Baptist Soc., 44 Conn. 259 (1877);
Wilmoth v. Wilmoth, 34 W. Va. 426 (1890); Schein v. Erasmus Realty Co.,
194 App. Div. 38, 184 N. Y. Supp. 840, (2d Dept. 1920); Hawk v. Hawk,
CASE NOTES
88 Pa. Super. Ct. 581 (1927). Contra: N. J. Title Guarantee Co. v. Smith,
90 N. J. Eq. 386, 108 Atl. 16 (1919) (as to personalty only). But there
has been a complete abandonment of the doctrine that an unincorporated
association cannot be the beneficiary of a trust. Mcker v. Lawrence, 212
N. W. 688 (Iowa, 1927); Van de Boget -v. Dutch Church, 219 App. Div.
220, 220 N. Y. Supp. 58 (2d Dept. 1927); Ruddick v. Albertcon, 154 Cal.
640, 98 Pac. 1045 (1908); Re Drummond [1914] 2 Ch. 90; Penny v. Col:e
Co., 138 Fed. 769 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905); Tavctt v. Taylor, 9 Cranch. 43
(U. S. 1815); 3 Maitland, Collected Papers (1911) 366 et scq.; but cf. Gray,
Gifts for a Non-Charitable Purpose (1902) 15 HARv. L. REV. 525. And
where a will purports to create a trust, equity will appoint suitable trustees,
if the will does not designate them, or if those designated do not act.
Olson v. Larson, 320 Ill. 50, 150 N. E. 337 (1926); Turner v. Henshaw, 155
N. E. 222 (Ind. App. 1927); Windsor r. Barnett, 201 Iowa 1226, 207 N. W.
362 (1926); Re Turk's Will, 128 Misc. 803, 221 N. Y. Supp. 225 (Surr. Ct.
1927); Doming v. Stanley, 162 Ga. 211, 133 S. E. 245 (1926); Case v.
Hasse, 83 N. J. Eq. 170, 93 Atl. 128 (1914); Kcmmerer v. Kemmncrcr, 233 IlL
327, 84 N. E. 256 (1908). Moreover, where a testator inadvisedly attempts
to make a direct devise to an unincorporated charitable association, courts
usually seem disinclined to allow a gift for such a purpose to fail for want
of a capable devisee. Thus, where such an association is connected with
a principal corporation, or is a branch or auxiliary thereof, some courts
construe the will as a devise to the corporation to be used for the purposes
of the unincorporated association. Rc Camcron's Estate, 113 Misc. 416, 184
N. Y. Supp. 540 (Surr. Ct. 1920); Reilly v. Union Infirmary, 87 Md. 664,
40 Atl. 894 (1898) ; Cosgrove v. Cosgrove, 69 Conn. 416, '3 Atl. 219 (1897) ;
Guild v. Allen, 28 R. L 430, 67 AtI. 855 (1907). Most courts, however, will
give the attempted devise the effect of a trust, naming trustees to hold the
property for the beneficiary association. Tillinghast v. Council at Narran-
gansett Pier, 133 Atl. 662 (R. I. 1926); Schneider -'. Klocpple, 270 Mo.
389, 193 S. W. 834 (1917); Eccles v. R. I. Hospital T-rut Co., 90 Conn.
592, 98 AtI. 129 (1916) ; Re Shand's Estate, 275 Pa. 77, 118 AtL. 623 (1922) ;
Wood v. Paine, 66 Fed. 807 (C. C. R. I. 1895) ; Bycrs v. McCartncy, 62 Iowa
339, 17 N. W. 571 (1883) ; Re Winchester's Estate, 133 Cal. 271, 65 Pac. 475
(1901); Washburn v. Sewall, 50 Mass. 280 (1845); Packer -e. Cowell, 16
N. H. 149 (1844). The court in the instant case thought the relation of the
unincorporated association to a parent corporation too distant to warrant a
construction of the will as a devise to the corporation. But in view of
the prevailing disposition to surmount a technicality that would defeat the
testator's intention, the failure of the instant court to carry out the will as
a trust -would seem regrettable.
CONDITIONAL SALEs-TRANSFER OF NOTES AS AmFECTING TITm.-The de-
fendant gave his notes to the plaintiff on conditional sale contracts of ma-
chinery. The plaintiff transferred these notes to a bank as collateral. The
defendant went into receivership and the plaintiff subsequently took up the
notes with the bank. In reclamation proceedings to recover the machines,
the defendant contended that the transfer of the notes to the bank was an
election to treat the sale as absolute and that "title" to the machines vested
in the defendant. The trial court held that such transfer indicated no
such election. Held, on appeal, that the decree be affirmed. McMull.
Machinery Co. v. Grand Rapids Trust Co., 214 N. W. 110 (Mich. 1927).
An act of the conditional vendor which is deemed by the court to be
"inconsistent" with his retaining "title" to the goods for the purpose of
security, is said to indicate an election to treat the sale as absolute and
to vest "title" in the buyer. Endicott v'. Digerncss, 103 Or. 555, 205 Pac.
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975 (1922); 2 Williston, Sales (2d ed. 1924) §§ 579, 579 (a). Taking the
buyer's notes is not such an "inconsistency." McArthur Bros. Mercantile Co.
w. Hagihara, 22 Ariz. 100, 194 Pac. 336 (1921); Bailey v. Baker le Ma-
chine Co., 239 U. S. 268, 36 Sup. Ct. 50 (1915); 2 Williston, op. cit. supra,
§ 579 (b). Contra: First Cong. Church v. Grand Rapids School-Furniture
Co., 15 Colo. App. 46, 60 Pac. 948 (1900). Nor is the renewal of such
notes. McDonald Automobile Co. v. Bicknell, 129 Tenn. 493, 167 S. W. 108
(1914). But accepting a mortgage from the buyer on the goods is. Crew-
son v. Commercial Investment Trust, Inc., 250 Pac. 521 (Okla. 1926); In re
A. E. Richardson Co., Inc., 294 Fed. 451 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923). And like-
wise the mere commencement of suit for the entire price. Utah Implement
Vehicle Co. v. Kesler, 36 Idaho 476, 211 Pac. 1079 (1922); Young v. Phil-
lips, 203 Mich. 566, 169 N. W. 822 (1918) ; F risch v. Wells, 200 Mass. 429,
86 N. E. 775 (1909); see 23 L. R. A. (N. s.) 144 (1910) annotation; (1919)
17 MIcH. L. Rv. 518. Contra: Twentieth Century Machinery Co. v. Excelsior
Springs Mineral Water Co., 180 Mo. App. 381, 171 S. W. 944 (1914) (dis-
continued suit held not an election). But the more desirable view would
seem to be that commencing suit on the note is not inconsistent with the
seller's rights as security holder, which remain till judgment is satisfied.
Murray v. McDonald, 212 N. W. 711 (Iowa, 1927); 2 Williston, op. cit.
supra, § 579 (a); Uniform Conditional Sales Act, § 24. When the buyer's
note is assigned, the security "title" to the goods passes as an incident with
the note. Zederman v. Thomson, 17 N. M. 56, 121 Pac. 609 (1912); 2 A
Bogert, Uniform Laws Annotated (1924) § 41 (b). Contra: Merchants &
Planters Bank v. Thomas, 69 Tex. 237, 6 S. W. 565 (1887). And when
the seller transfers the notes as security for his own debts, as in the in-
stant case, it is not an election to treat the sale as absolute, and the sel-
ler's rights as security holder remain. Schneider v. Daniel, 191 Ind. 59,
131 N. E. 816 (1921); Estes v. Lamb, 149 Ark. 369, 233 S. W. 99 (1921);
In re Rector's, 220 Fed. 645 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915) ; 2 Williston, op. cit. supra,
§ 579 (b). Contra: Winton Motor Carriage Co. v. Broadway Automobile
Co., 65 Wash. 650, 118 Pac. 817 (1911); see MacLeod v. Aberdeen Brewing
Co., 82 Wash. 74, 79, 143 Pac. 440, 442 (1914). But the doctrine of the
Washington cases does not seem to be consistent with later holdings in the
same jurisdiction. Cf. Thayer v. Yakima Tire Service Co., 116 Wash. 299,
199 Pac. 234 (1921) ; 2 A Bogert, op. cit. supra, § 127, 41 (b). The instant
decision recognizes a common business practice by sellers of raising funds
by pledging such credit instruments as collateral. Also, in upholding such
conditional sale agreements, the result is beneficial to all parties concerned
in that it makes for more extensive and flexible uses of sellers' assets, and,
in the resulting stimulation of sales, the buyer is favored by lower prices.
CORPORATIONs--LEASES-RESPONSIBILITY OF LESSOR RAILROAD FOR ToRT
or LEssEE.-The defendant and the X railways were jointly using the form-
er's road. The movement and operation of the trains of both were exclus-
ively directed and controlled by defendant. Due to the negligence of the
employees of X, a head-on collision occurred, injuring the plaintiff, the
engineer of defendant's train. In an action under the Federal Employers
Liability Law, verdict was directed for the plaintiff. Held, on appeal, that
motion for new trial be denied on the ground that defendant, to protect
his employees, was under a duty to keep the tracks clear for the operation
of trains. Nectaux v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 18 F. (2d) 681 (W. D.
La. 1926).
Unless authorized by legislative authority to lease, a lessor railroad is
uniformly held responsible for torts committed by the lessee in the opera-
tion of the road. Briscoe v. Southern Kan. Ry., 40 Fed. 273 (W. D. Ark.
260
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1889); Abbott v. Johnstown Ry., 80 N. Y. 27 (1880); 7 Elliott, Railroads
(2d ed. 1921) § 537. Even when the lessee's acts are those of a warehouse-
man. Railroad v. Moody, 71 Tex. 614, 9 S. W. 465 (1888) (goods burned
while awaiting consignee). But not for the lessee's violation of the Inter-
state Commerce Act. Western N. Y. Ry. v. Pcun Refining Co., 137 Fed.
343 (C. C. A. 3d, 1905) (charging of rates in excess of regulation). Even
under authorized leases, some courts require express statutory exemption
for the lessor to escape responsibility. Logan v. North Carolina Ry., 116
N. C. 940, 21 S. E 959 (1895) ; Singleton v. Southwestern Ry., 70 Ga. 464
(1883). This, on the notion that the grant of the privilege to lease should
be strictly construed to preclude a concomitant immunity from tort re-
sponsibility. Balsley v. St. Louis Ry., 119 Ill. (8, 8 N. E. 859 (1886). Most
cases, however, seem to consider the amount of control delegated as a cri-
terion of responsibility, and so, where entire control passed, the lessor was
held not responsible. Caruthers v. Kansas City Ry., 59 Kan. 629, 54 Pac.
673 (1898) (exclusive control of all rolling stock, and disbursement of
earnings conferred on lessee); Moorshead v. United Ry., 119 MIo. App. 541,
96 S. W. 261 (1906) (all rolling stock, and personal and real pr-operty
with the exclusive privilege of running trains over the road conferred on
the lessee). But the exemption to the lessor is limited to injuries due to
the operation of the road. Lee v. Southern Pac. Ry., 11G Cal. 97, 417 Pac.
932 (1897) (lessor held responsible for injury due to defective roadbed);
St. Louis Railway v. Curl, 28 Kan. 622 (1882) (lessor responsible for fail-
ure to erect cattleguards); Nugcnt v. Boston Ry., 80 Ble. (2, 12 Atl. 797
(1888) (negligently constructed awning on a station house). V, here Eome
control is retained the lessor may be held. Driscoll v. No;,zvich Ry., 05
Conn. 230, 32 Atl. 354 (1894) (lessor's treasurer having control over dis-
bursement of the earnings); Manning v. Ry., 107 Tex. 546, 181 S. W. 6S7
(1916) (authority to employ and discharge train crews of the lessee);
Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. v. Miller, 98 Tex. 270, 83 S. W. 182 (1905) (control of
lessee's train orders); Cincinnati Ry. v. Sleeper, 5 Ohio Dec. (Reprint) 196
(18714) (control of road by joint committee). Likewise in case of injuries
by a temporary joint user of the road. Hawwmond v. I"ansas Ry., 109 Ola.
72, 234 Pac. 731 (1925). The instant case seems to be amply supported by
authority.
EVIDENCE--PREL'INARY QUESTIONS OF FACT AS TO ADnIISSIBILITY-LoST
INSTRUAIENTS.-In an action of trespass to try title to land, the defendant
claimed under X, whose deed of title was alleged to have bcen lost. There
was conflicting testimony as to whether the destruction of the deed was ac-
cidental or intentional. The trial court held that the destruction was wil-
ful, thereby making secondary evidence as to its execution and contents in-
admissible in the absence of sufficient proof to overcome the presumption
of fraud. A verdict was directed for the plaintiff. Held, on appeal (one
judge dissenting), that it was error for the trial court to decide that the
alleged deed was intentionally destroyed, since this was an issue of fact for
the jury. Massie v. Hutcheson, 296 S. W. 939 (Te. Civ. App. 1927).
Generally it is within the province of the trial judge to determine any
preliminary question of fact affecting the admissibility of secondary evi-
dence to prove the contents of a lost deed. Mays v. Moore, 13 Tex. 85
(1854); St. Croix Co. v. Sea Coast Canning Co., 114 hie. 521, 96 Ati. 1059
(1916); Martinez v. Bruni, 216 S. W. 655 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919); Wright
v. Rever, 136 Atl. 61 (Aid. 1927); 2 Wigmore, Evidcnce (2d ed. 1923) §
1194. And the manner of loss of an original document is such an incidental
question of fact. Massie v. Hutcheson, 270 S. W. 544 (Tex. Comm. App.
1925); Mason v. Libbey, 90 N. Y. 683 (1882). In some states, the trial
YALE LAW JOURNAL
court's finding seems to be conclusive, unless the court chooses to report the
evidence for appellate consideration. See Dunklee v. Prior, 80 N. H. 270,
273, 116 Atl. 138, 139 (1922); Sarle v. Arnold, 7 R. I. 582, 586 (1863).
But many states revise the trial court's determination under the guise of
ascertaining whether its descretion has been abused. Collins 'd. Boyd, 59
S. W. 831 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900); Foster v. MacKay, 7 Mete. 531 (Mass.
1844); Freeman v. Rice Institute, 60 Tex. Civ. App. 191, 128 S. NV. 629
(1910). Or error of law has been committed. Avery v. Stewart, 134 N. C.
287, 46 S. E. 519 (1904) ; Ames v. N. Y., N. H., & H. R. R., 221 Mass. 304,
108 N. E. 920 (1915) ; Robertson v. Talmadge, 174 S. W. 627 (Tex. Civ. App.
1915). A few states permit the judge to submit such disputed questions of
fact to the jury. Niles v. Houston Oil Co., 191 S. NV. 748 (Tex. Civ. App.
1916) ; Dunklee v. Prior, supra; King v. Hanson, 13 N. D. 85, 99 N. W. 1085
(1904); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 36 Mich. 502 (1877). Still
others require such submission. Gordon v. Bowers, 16 Pa. 226 (1851);
Gaskins v. Guthrie, 162 Ga. 103, 132 S. E. 764 (1926). The usually stated
formula is that the evidence to establish the loss of a deed must be clear
and convincing. Lucas v. Hensley, 81 W. Va. 239, 94 S. E. 138 (1917);
Massie v. Hutcheson, 258 S. W. 244 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924). This is so be-
cause in decreeing a reproduction of a lost deed, the court is virtually
establishing title to land by paroL In re Nicholls, 190 Pa. 308, 313, 42
AtI. 692, 694 (1899). The temptation to fraud and perjury necessitates
receiving such evidence with great caution. Mays v. Moore, supra at 88.
2 Moore, Facts (1908) § 891. In view of the strictness of the rule, It
would seem preferable that conflicting testimony on the material point
should be decided by the trained legal mind of the court. It is difficult for
an ordinary jury to disregard incompetent evidence which it has considered.
See State v. Armstrong, 118 La. 480, 482, 43 So. 57, 58 (1907). The evalu-
ation of the credibility of the respective witnesses in the instant case,
which had been litigated in Texas courts for more than fifteen years, was
peculiarly appropriate for the court. Any abdication of the judicial func-
tion in favor of the jury would seem ill advised. 5 Wigmore, op. cit. supra,
§ 2550. See Maguire and Epstein, Preliminary Questions of Fact in Deter-
mining the Admissibility of Evidence (1927) 40 HARV. L. R.V. 392 (sug-
gesting a number of possible solutions to the problem of choice of judge or
jury).
EVIDENCE-PRIOR CONVICTIONS INADMISSInLE TO SHOW RBPUTATION.-The
defendants were convicted for keeping a disorderly house. The trial court
allowed the state to prove that frequenters of the house had been convicted
of prostitution and other criminal offenses. Held, on appeal, that the judg-
ment be reversed because such evidence was inadmissible to show reputa-
tion of frequenters. State v. Nickelsporn, 138 At]. 310 (N. J. 1927).
In general, courts admit evidence showing the general reputation of in-
mates and frequenters of alleged disorderly houses on the ground that
such reputation is a fact in issue. People v. Pasquale, 206 N. Y. 598, 100
N. E. 413 (1912) ; Marshall v. Newport, 200 Ky. 663, 255 S. W. 259 (1923).
But such evidence must be corroborated, being insufficient alone to con-
vict. Ward v. State, 14 Ga. App. 110, 80 S. E. 295 (1913). Similarly,
evidence of the bad character or lack of chastity of the defendant has been
held competent as proof of the character of the house even though the defend-
ant had not put his character in issue. Claiburne v. State, 100 Tex. Cr.
App. 322, 273 S. W. 260 (1925); Howard v. People, 27 Colo. 396, 61 Pac.
595 (1900) (previous conviction admissible). Contra: State v. Barnard,
64 Mo. 260 (1876). Many kinds of evidence have been admitted to establish
the character of frequenters. Nakano v. United States. 262 Fed. 761 (C.
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C. A. 9th, 1920) (testimony of doctor as to diseased condition of inmates);
State v. Alston, 28 N. M. 379, 212 Pac. 1031 (1923) (indecent and vulgar
language and conversation); State v. Toombs, 79 Iowa 741, 45 N. W. Z00
(1890) (conversations occuring in house during accused's absence) ; Key v.
State, 71 Tex. Cr. App. 485, 160 S. W. 354 (1913) (conduct of frequenters).
Likewise, specific acts of unchastity have been held proper evidence. Beard
v. State, 71 Md. 275, 17 Atl. 1044 (1889). Contra: State v. Baanc, 17 N. J.
L. 123, 71 AtL 111 (1908). It has been urged that such instances of con-
duct should be admitted in cases like the present on the ground that the
usual objections to such evidence in proving character, *z., undue preju-
dice and confusion of issues, are not present and a greater practical neces-
sity exists when character is a fact in issue. 1 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed.
1923) . 202. Evidence of conviction has been generally held relevant to
show the character of frequenters. Hardeman v,. State, 94 Tex. Cr. App.
642, 252 S. W. 503 (1923) ; Harwood v. People, 26 N. Y. 190 (1863) (con-
viction for prostitution held prima facie evidence of character of frequent-
ers). Contra: People v. Newbold, 260 Ill. 196, 103 N. E. 69 (1913). The
classification of "conviction of prostitution" as a "specific act of immoral-
ity" and hence inadmissible as being irrevelent would seem to be unwar-
ranted, since the public notoriety of a conviction would seem to be such as
to charge the accused with notice thereof.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-DESCRIPTION OF REPRFEENrATIVE CA-
PAcrrY.-An adminstrator brought replevin to recover furniture which had
been the property of his intestate. Since he had never had possession of
the property, the cause of action accrued to him only in his representative
capacity. In the caption of the complaint, the action was described as one
to recover furniture "belonging to F. D. A., adminstrator of the estate of
C. E. A., deceased." There was no other allusion in the complaint to the
decedant, or to the plaintiff's office as administrator, though his appoint-
ment and qualification were admitted. Plaintiff was nonsuited at the trial
court. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be affirmed, as the words quoted
were mere descriptio personae, and insufficient to show that plaintiff brought
the action in his representative capacity. Ames v. Weston, 138 At]. 560
(Ale. 1927).
An executor or administrator bringing an action only in his representa-
tive capacity must show this capacity in his complaint. Hamilton r. Mclndoo,
81 Minn. 324, 84 N. W. 118 (1900) ; Bancroft, Code Pleading (1920) § 1400;
Sutherland, Code Pleading and Practice (1910) § 3319. From the author-
ity cited it may be inferred that the instant court nonsuited the plaintiff
because the caption of his complaint read "administrator" instead of "as
administrator." Bragdon v. Harmon, 69 Me. 29 (1878). Other courts have
similarly held that "administrator" alone was merely descriptio personae
while "as administrator" was necessary to show a representative capac-
ity. Lucas v. Pittman, 94 Ala. 616, 10 So. 603 (1891); Burling v. Thoinp-
kins, 77 Cal. 257, 19 Pac. 429 (1888). But the leading view today disre-
gards the caption alone, if capacity is shown in the pleadings as a whole.
Beers v. Shannon, 73 N. Y. 292 (1878) (allegation of issuance of letters
testamentary to plaintiff, and of administration of goods by him); Ala-
bamnz City, G. & A. R. Co. '. Heald, 178 Ala. 636, 59 So. 401 (1912)
(damages alleged for death of plaintiff's "intestate"); Carr v. Carr, 13
Cal. App. 480, 115 Pac. 261 (1911) (allegation of appointment of plaintiff
as administrator, and averment of demands made by him "as such admin-
istrator"); Trasv v. Karrick, 87 Vt. 451, 89 Atl. 472 (1914) (notes alleged
to have been endorsed by plaintiff's testator). Likewise, where the caption
describes the plaintiff "as administrator," the suit has been held to have
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been brought in an. individual capacity, on an examination of the entire
pleadings. Rich -v. Sowles, 64 Vt. 408, 23 AtI. 723 (1892) ; Smiley v. Finu-
cane, 134 N. Y. Supp. 59 (Sup. Ct. S. T. 1911). It has been pointed out
that the requirement of a specific allegation of representative capacity in
such actions merely gives the defendant an opportunity to make a dilatory
objection \which is rarely decisive as to the cause of action. Clark, Coln-
plaint-Allegations in Particular Actio ns (1927) 5 N. C. L. REV. 214. This
same criticism would likewise apply to the instant decision.
INSURANCE--FiIE INSURANCE--DAMAG0 FROM SMOKR AND SOOT OF
"FRENDLY F;RE."-The plaintiff's house and its contents were damaged by
smoke and soot caused by defective action of an oil burner system. An
action was brought under an insurance policy covering "loss or damage by
fire." The evidence showed that the fire was at no time outside of the fur-
nace, and judgment was given for the defendant. Held, on appeal, that
the judgment be affirmed on the ground that damage by smoke and soot
from a fire confined within the furnace was not covered by the policy.
Lavitt v. Hartford County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 105 Conn. 729, 136 Atl. 572
(1927).
The first court called upon to construe the meaning of fire in an insur-
ance policy denied recovery for damage done l'y smoke on the ground that
the fire was of ordinary size and confined to a furnace. Austin v. Drewe, 4
Camp. 360 (N. P. 1815) (a register in the chimney negligently left closed
caused smoke from the ordinary fire in the furnace to escape and destroy
sugar). American courts, though purporting to follow the English case,
seem to deny recovery solely on the ground that the fire remained confined,
without consideration of the test as to the size of the fire. Cf. Gibbons v.
German Ins. and Savings Institution, 30 II. App. 263 (1888) (steam
escaping from broken steam pipe damaged plaintiff's furniture); Cannon
v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 110 Ga. 563, 35 S. E. 775 (1900) (disconnected stove
pipe allowed smoke and soot from fire in stove to escape and do damage);
American Towing Co. v. German Fire Ins. Co., 74 Md. 25, 21 Atl. 553
(1891) (steam boiler from which the water had been drawn off dam-
aged by heat from fire in the pit). Likewise, the test of a "hostile" fire is
that it be accidental and burn in a place not intended. Cf. Way v. Abing-
ton Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 166 Mass. 67, 43 N. E. 1032 (1896) (fire in chim-
ney held hostile); Pappadakis v. Netherlands Fire & Life Ins. Co., 137
Wash. 430, 242 Pac. 641 (1926) (fire escaping through crack in oven held
hostile); Cabell v. Milwaukee Mechanics Ins. Co., 218 Mo. App. 31, 260
S. W. 490 (1924) (live cpals thrown out of heater on to dirt floor held
"hostile" fire). Text writers also take the view that recovery is to be
denied wherever the fire remained confined. 1 Wood, Fire Insurance (2d
ed. 1886) § 103, citing Austin v. Drew, supra. The reasoning of the cases
and of the text writers indicates that recovery would be denied even
though the confined fire were excessive or otherwise operating in a man-
ner not expected. See Abbott, The Meaning of Fire in an Insurance Policy
(1910) 24 HARV. L. REV. 119, 135. This appears to be the result reached in
at least two cases. Samuels v. Continental Ins. Co., 2 Pa. Dist. Rep. 397
(1892) (flame flared up two or three feet above lamp chimney); Hansen V.
Lemars Mut. Ins. Ass'n., 186 Iowa 1, 196 N. W. 468 (1922) (burners of oil
stove turned up too high, causing stove to give off smoke and soot). But
the rule is the other way in a Wisconsin case which sought to limit the
doctrine of "friendly fires" to the tests of the English case. O'Connor v.
Queen Ins. Co., 140 Wis. 388, 122 N. W. 1038 (1909) (recovery allowed
where the fire, though confined to the furnace burned with unexpected
violence and excessive heat). In support of the Wisconsin case it might
264
CASE NOTES
be argued that doubtful terms are to be construed in favor of the insured.
1 Joyce, Insurance (2d ed. 1917) § 221, n. 6. Although the court in the
instant case, by applying simply the test as to the locus of the fire, is ex-
tending the doctrine of Austin v. Drew, supra, its decision may be justified
on the ground that the contemplated risk upon which the premiums were
computed did not include the risk in question in view of the respectable
line of authorities which had already so held. But cf. Vance, Fricndly
Fires (1927) 1 CONN. B. J. 284.
INSURANCE-ILLEGALrTY OF RlSK-PUBLiC PoLIC.-The plaintiff was con-
victed of manslaughter for having killed a person while driving his auto-
mobile under the influence of liquor. He was also subjected to a judgment
in a civil action. The defendant, his insurer, refused to satisfy the judg-
ment, contending that to do so would violate public policy since the obliga-
tion arose through criminal conduct. Held, that judgment be entered for
plaintiff. James v. British General Ins. Co., 137 L. T. IL 156 (K. B. Div.
1927).
It is generally said that one cannot insure himself against the conse-
quences of his own intended illegal acts. Ritter v. Alut. Life Ins. Co., 169
U. S. 139, 18 Sup. Ct. 300 (1898) (suicide); Wells v. New Eng. Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 191 Pa. 207, 43 Atl. 126 (1899) (death by abortion). But a life
insurance policy has been held not to be avoided because of the legal execu-
tion of the insured. Weeks v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 128 S. C. 223, 122 S. E.
586 (1924). Contra: Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McCue, 223 U. S.
234, 32 Sup. Ct. 220 (1912). And an employer may insure himself against
losses occasioned by the criminal conduct of his employees Taxicab Motor
Co. v. Pac. Coast Casualty Co., 73 Wash. 631, 132 Pac. 393 (1913). Like-
wise an insurance company may lawfully insure a conditional vendor
against losses sustained because of the confiscation of an automobile while
used by the conditional vendee in violation of the prohibition laws. Fidelity
& Deposit Co. v. Moore, 3 F. (2d) 652 (D. Or. 1925). Insurance contracts
indemnifying against loss of life and property damage caused by the in-
sured's negligence are enforceable. Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Mercliant3
Transp. Co., 15 F. (2d) 946 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926). And the same result is
reached though the insured was guilty of minor violations of motor vehicle
laws. Messersmith v. American Fidelity Co., 232 N. Y. 101, 133 N. E. 432
(1921) (driver under statutory age); Brock v. Travelers Ins. Co., 88 Conn.
308, 91 Atl. 279 (1914) (same); McMahon v. Pearlman, 242 Mass. 367, 136
N. E. 154 (1922) (unlicensed driver) ; Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Haley, 129
Mliss. 525, 92 So. 635 (1922) (violation of speed law). Since, in many in-
stances, the insured's civil liability is predicated on the infraction of some
traffic regulation, to restrict an insurer's responsibility to those cases where
no such criminal conduct exsted would render indemnity insurance of
negligible value. There is a conflict as to whether more reprehensible
criminal conduct on the part of the insured renders the insurance contract
unenforceable. Cf. Tinline v. White Cross Ins. Ass'n, Ltd., 125 L. T. IL 632;
[1921] 3 K. B. 327 (gross negligence resulting in manslaughter-recovery
allowed); O'Hearn v. Yorkshire Ins. Co., 67 D. L. R. 735 (Ont. 1921)
(manslaughter by intoxicated driver-recovery denied). The instant case is
commendable in that it lends support to the policy of protecting the public
from risk of injury by financially irresponsible drivers. Cf. M5ASS. Comr-
PuLsORY MOTOR VEHICLE INS. LAW, Acts & Resolves of Mass. 1926, c.
368, §§ 1-6).
INNK.EEPERS--DEFINITION FOR PURPOSE OF STATUTORY POVISIoN.-The
defendant operated a thirty-five room establishment for the accomodation
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of transient guests. There was no dining room. The plaintiff, a guest on
a weekly rate basis, sought to recover for injuries sustained during a fire,
because of the failure of the defendant to comply with certain statutory
requirements imposed on "hotels." At the trial, the jury found that the
establishment was a "hotel" and returned a verdict for the plaintiff. Held,
on appeal, that the judgment be reversed since the common law elements
of an "inn" were not present. Dixon v. Robbins, 246 N. Y. 169, 158 N. E,
63 (1927).
At common law, in order to establish an innkeeper's responsibility to a
guest, it was required that food, lodging and stabling be available to the
guest. Cf, Cromwell v. Stephens, 2 Daly 15 (N. Y. 1867); 5 Bacon's
Abridgment, Inns and Innskeepers (1844) § B; Story, Bailments (8th
ed. 1870) § 475. But courts no longer insist upon all of these requirements
in determining the existence of responsibility in particular cases. Accord-
ingly, it has been held that to establish responsibility for the loss of a
guest's goods, it need not appear that stabling was available. Thompson V.
Lacy, 3 B. & Ald. 283 (1820). Nor that provision was made for food.
Nelson v. Johnson, 104 Minn. 440, 116 N. W. 828 (1908); Kanelles v. Locke,
12 Ohio App. 210 (1919) ; Metzler v. Terminal Hotel Co., 135 Mo. App. 410,
115 S. NV. 1037 (1907) (adjoining restaurant operated by a third party).
And it seems that the responsibility was not affected by the guest's enter-
ing under an agreement to remain a definite period of time. Hancock v.
Rand, 94 N. Y. 1 (1883) (seven months). Nor by a mutual agreement as
to the terms of payment. Holstein v. Phillips, 146 N. C. 366, 59 S. E.
1037 (1909) (ten dollars per week). But of. Waitt Const. Co. v. Chase,
197 App. Div. 327, 188 N. Y. Supp. 589 (1st Dept. 1921) (concerning a
statutory exemption clause); Roberts v. Case Hotel, 106 Misc. 481, 175
N. Y. Supp. 123 (1st. Dept. 1919) (apartment hotel). Failure to operate the
establishment during all hours of the day was no defense in a prosecution for
"presuming" to be an innkeeper without a license. Commonwealth v.
Weatherbee, 101 Mass. 214 (1869). And the maintenance of a building
open to transients has been held to be a violation of a restrictive user cov-
enant against hotels even though no food was served. Huntley v. Stanch-
field, 168 Wis. 119, 169 N. W. 276 (1918). A statutory hotelman's lien
has been enforced although the rooms of the establishment were unfur-
nished. Kieffer v. Keogh, 188 S. W. 44 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916). A room
adjoining a hotel, in no way used by guests, but rented for yearly periods
was held to fall within a statute prohibiting card games at hotels. Foster
v. State, 84 Ala. 451, 4 So. 833 (1888). The inclination to construe the
word "hotel" according to the purpose to be served should be a strong
reason for broadening its scope under a statute, so long as the purpose of
the measure is thereby served. Cf. Foster v. State, supra. And it seems
improbable that the framers of a measure which was designed to protect
the inmates of buildings open to transients should have intended, as a test
of responsibility for its breach, the presence of characteristics of purely
historical significance.
LIBEL-CORPORATIONS-DEFANIATION OF ANTI-VICE SOCIETY ACTIONABLE
PER SE.-The plaintiff was a corporation organized to suppress obscene
literature. The defendant, a newspaper company, charged the plaintiff
with "engineering" crimes to obtain half of the fines. Held, that this was
libelous per se since it impaired the plaintiff's credit in the management of
its business and caused pecuniary loss. New York Society for the Suppres-
sion of Vice v. MacFadden Publications Inc., 129 Misc. 408, 221 N. Y. Supp.
563 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
In most, cases of libel on a corporation an analogy has been drawn to a
CASE NOTES
natural person. See First National Bank v. Winters, 225 N. Y. 47, 52, 121
N. E. 459, 460 (1918); South Hetton Coal Co. v,. North Eastern News
Ass'n, 1 Q. B. 133, 138 (1894) ; Newell, Slander and Libel (1924) 344. An
article which injures a person in his trade is libelous per se and actionable
-without proof of special damage. Holazes v. Jones, 121 N. Y. 461, 24 N. E.
701 (1890). The same is true of a corporation. Reporters' Ass'n of Amer-
ica v. Sun Printing and Pub. Co., 186 N. Y. 437, 79 N. E. 710 (1906);
International Text Book Co. v. Leader Printing Co., 189 Fed. 86 (N. D. Ohio,
1910). In addition, an article is libelous per se if it injures a person's
reputation by bringing him into hatred, ridicule or contempt. Sydney v.
MacFadden Publishing Corp., 242 N. Y. 208, 151 N. E. 209 (1926) ; Orband
v. Kalamazoo Telegraph Co., 170 Blich. 387, 136 N. W. 380 (1912). But
most courts hold that a corporation cannot have a reputation for this
purpose. Erick Bowman Remedy Co. t. Jensen Salsbery Laboratorics, 17
F. (2d) 255 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Reporters' Ass'n of Amcrica v. Sun
Print. & Pub. Co., supra. Contra: Finnish Tcnipcrance Society Sovitlaja V.
Publishing Co., 238 Mlass. 345, 130 N. E. 845 (1921). Thus a corporation
has an action for libel per se only when injured in its business or credit.
See Adirondack Record Inc. v. Lawrence, 202 App. Div. 251, 254, 255, 195
N. Y. Supp. 627, 629, 630 (3rd Dept. 1922); Dupont Engineering Co. v.
Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 13 F. (2d) 186, 189 (AT. D. Tenn. 1925). This
rule applied to corporations not organized for profit causes some difficulty.
See opinion in instant case at 565. In a situation similar to that of the
instant case the Massachusetts court solved the problem by giving damages
for injury to reputation. Finnish Tezp. Soc. v. Pub. Co., spra. A recent
New York decision held that a membership corporation had no "credit"
and therefore could not suffer any pecuniary loss. Electrical Board of
Trade v. Sheehan, 214 App. Div. 712, 210 N. Y. Supp. 127 (1st Dept. 1925).
The instant case is distinguished on the ground that a corporation organ-
ized for a specific purpose is organized for the "business" of carrying on
such work, and may thus suffer injury to its credit, i. c., loss of contribu-
tions. The adoption of the Massachusetts view would obviate such fine
distinctions.
AsTER AND SERVANT-RESPONSIBILITY OF MASTER FoR TORT OF SERVANT
BASED ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF SERVANT FOR DAMAGES.-The wife of an em-
ployee sued the employer for injuries suffered while riding as a passenger
in an automobile being driven by her husband in the course of his employ-
er's business. The jury found that the injury was caused by the negli-
gence of the employee. Held, that since the servant was under an immunity
from a suit in tort by his wife, the master enjoyed a like immunity, his
responsibility being secondary and derived from the responsibility of the
servant. Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., 129 Alisc. 578, 222 N. Y.
Supp. 115. (Sup. Ct. 1927).
Relying on the common law theory of the legal indentity of husband
and wife, most jurisdictions still refuse to allow a wife to sue her husband
for a personal tort. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611, 31 Sup. Ct.
111 (1910); Rogers v. Rogers, 265 Mlo. 200, 177 S. W. 382 (1915); Pert-
man v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 117 Mlisc. 353, 191 N. Y. Supp. 891 (Sup.
Ct. 1921); Woltnmn v. Woltman, 153 Blinn. 217, 189 N. W. 1022 (1922).
But a modern tendency to the contrary allows such a suit, finding in the
married women's acts a legislative intent to abrogate the common law fic-
tion of legal identity and to restore to a married woman all the capacities
of a feme sole. Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 Atl. 432 (1925);
Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917); Roberts r. Robcrta,
185 N. C. 566, 118 S. E. 9 (1923) ; Gilman v. Gilman, 78 N. H. 4, 95 Ati. 57
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(1915); see Comment (1924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL 315; (1926) 10 MINN.
L. REV. 439; (1926) 26 COL. L. REV. 895. On the other hand, the gen-
eral policy underlying the master's responsibility for negligent acts of
his servant seems to be that such risks are an incident of the master's
business. See Bugge v. Brown, 26 C. L. R. 110, 3 Dr. R. C. 631 (High
Ct. Australia, 1919). The reasons would apply equally to injuries caused
to the servant's wife as to any other case, while to allow a suit by the
wife against the master would not seem to infringe the reasons of policy
for the immunity granted in husband and wife cases. The instant court
relied on cases denying recovery against a master, where the facts failed
to state a cause of action against the servant, there being no proof of
careless conduct by the latter. New Orleans & N. E. R. R. v. Jopes, 142
U. S. 18, 12 Sup. Ct. 109 (1891); Hobbs v. Ill. Central R. R., 171 Iowa
624, 152 N. W. 40 (1915). But in the instant case, the servant was
expressly found guilty of negligence. The court might have based its
decision on the rule that a master is not responsible for injuries to an un-
authorized invitee. Nelson v. Johnstown Traction Go., 276 Pa. 178, 119 Atl.
918 (1923); Rolfe v. Hewitt, 227 N. Y. 486, 125 N. E. 804 (1920); see
(1925) 3 Wis. L. REV. 188. This would obviously not cover many cases
where the invitee factor was not present. It would seem desirable to dis-
regard altogether, as serving a purpose not primarily in question in these
cases, the rule that husband or wife may not sue each other for torts.
PATENTS--DEFENSE OF DOUBLE PATENTING NOT AVAILABLE AGAINST
MECHANICAL PATENT AFTER PRIOR DESIGN PATENT TO SAMIV INVENTOR IS
DECLARED INVALID.-An anticipating design patent for a child's tricycle was
followed by a mechanical patent thereon to the same inventor. The District
Court dismissed a suit for the infringement of both patents on the ground
of double patenting. Held, on appeal, that the design patent was invalid
for want of rudimentary aesthetic appeal while the mechhnical patent was
valid, since, on being relieved of his first dedication, the inventor was again
free to dedicate his disclosure, and the defense of double patenting did
not apply. H. C. White Co. v. Morton E. Converse & Son Co., 20 F. (2d)
311 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927).
Where an inventor obtains two patents for the same invention the later
patent is void. Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U. S. 186, 14 Sup. Ct. 310
(1894). But the same article may exhibit patentable mechanical invention
as well as a patentable design, in which case the mechanical and design
patents may co-exist. Mathieu v. Mitchell Vance Co., 7 F. (2d) 837 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1925). Yet where a design and mechanical patent disclose the same
inventive thought, the general rule applies and the one of later issue is
void. Roberts v. Bennett, 136 Fed. 193 (C. C. A. 2d, 1905); President
Suspender Co. v. Macwilliam, 233 Fed. 433 (S. D. N. Y. 1916). Even
where the anticipating design patent is declared invalid, it has been said
that the subsequent mechanical patent still fails because of double patent-
ing. Williams Calk Co. v. Neverdlip Mfg. Co., .136 Fed. 210, 212 (M. D. Pa.
1905), aff'd on other grounds, 145 Fed. 928 (C. C. A. 3d, 1906). But the
instant court refused so technical a rule. And where a prior design patent
for a glass was declared invalid for want of ornamental qualities a me-
chanical patent thereon was sustained. Ferd Messmer Mfg. Co. v. Albert
Pick & Co., 251 Fed. 894 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918). A mechanical patent for an
auto parking light has also been held valid after a prior design patent
thereon was held invalid for want of invention. Gross v. Norris, 18 F. (2d)
418 (D. Md. 1927). The vice of double patenting lies in that the original
monopoly is thereby extended, but this objection is not well taken in the in-
stant and similar cases as no monopoly is conferred on the issue of the in-
valid design patents. The inventor acquires his exclusive right to make,
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use, and vend only after issue of the valid mechanical patents, and the
period of monopoly properly dates therefrom.
PIEADING--AIENDED ANSWERS--STATING NEW DEFENsE .- In an action
on a promissory note, the defendant pleaded the general issue. After
joinder by the plaintiff, the defendant amended his answer to plead forgery.
The plaintiff's motion to have the amendment struck out was denied and
judgment was given for the defendant. On appeal, it was held (one judge
dissenting) that the judgment be reversed as in contravention of the statute.
Md. Code (Bagby, 1924) Art. 75, § 28, subd. 108 (providing that the execu-
tion of a written instrument filed in the pleadings must be denied in the
next succeeding pleading or be taken as admitted). Fariers' & Merchants
Nat. Bank of Cambridge v. Harper, 137 Atl. 702 (Md. 1927).
Courts are generally liberal in permitting the amendment of answers.
Cartwright v. Ruffin, 43 Colo. 377, 96 Pac. 261 (1908) (answer denying
execution of note, amended to plea of execution fraudulently procured);
Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Bull, 120 Ark. 43, 179 S. W. 172 (1915) (an-
swer amended after case called to trial); Fischer v. Fuclbcrth, 109 Neb.
779, 192 N. W. 225 (1923) (amendment allowed on day of trial); Kcrshaw
v. Reynolds, 254 Pac. 713 (Okla. 1927) (at commencement of trial); Thorn
v. Smith, 71 Wis. 18, 36 N. W. 707 (1888) (during trial); Kellogg 1. Scott,
58 N. J. Eq. 344, 44 Atl. 190 (1899) (after plaintiff's testimony disclosed
an unexpected defense); Hughes Bros. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 148 Tenn. 293,
255 S. W. 363 (1923); Pomeroy, Code Remedies (4th ed. 1904) § 457;
Brown, The Law of Pleading (1899) 282. This is especially true if the
amended answer is predicated upon a defense prima facie valid. State v.
Central Pocahontas Coal Co., 83 W. Va. 230, 98 S. E. 214 (1919) ; Johnson
v. Alexander, 87 Wash. 570, 151 Pac. 1121 (1915) ; Story, Equity Pleading
(8th ed. 1870) § 902. Contra: Pue v. Bzshnle , 72 Mont. 265, 233 Pac. 124
(1925) (supplemental answer of discharge in bankruptcy refused because
of delay in filing). Inconsistency of the amended answer with the original
answer is sometimes no bar. Thompson v. Rhyner, 80 Okla. 146, 200 Pac.
609 (1922). Contra: Bankers' Mortgage Co. v,. Robson, 123 Kan. 746, 256
Pac. 997 (1927). If errors in pleading prejudice or nullify the complaint
or answer, they should be construed more stringently against the plaintiff,
who is usually privileged to have a voluntary non-suit and later predicate
another action on a corrected complaint. But the original suit may be
prosecuted in spite of the defendant's objection and a refusal to allow him
to amend may, in fact, destroy his "day in court." See Cathwrright v. Ruf-
fin, supra at 377, 96 Pac. at 261-2; Diawond v,. Williainzsburgh Inc. Co., 4
Daley 494, 495 (N. Y. 1873). The defendant may be protected by a con-
tinuance in the case of a surprise amendment. See Pomeroy, 6p. cit. c,.pra,
at 646 n.; State v. Central Pocahontas Coal Co., supra at 219. The purpose
of the statute is not to penalize the defendant for a serious omizion in his
answer, but to relieve the plaintiff of the burden of proving what the de-
fendant may admit. Md. Code (Bagby, 1924) Art. 75, § 28, subd. 108; see
Bank v. McCosker, 82 Md. 518, 525-6, 34 Atl. 539, 541 (I396). Liberal in-
terpretations of statutes granting discretionary powers to raise the sub-
stantive issues are consistent with modern tendencies. Clark, History, Sy.-
tems and Functions of Pleading (1925) 11 VA. L. REv. 517, 518, 519, 542;
Pound, Canons of Procedural Reform (1926) 51 AM. B. A. J. 290, 298-99;
Poe, Pleading and Practice (5th ed. 1925) § 184. Maryland is a "quasi
common law" state with code liberality. Clark, op. cit. -upra, at 530;
Rawls, Maryland Procedure In Courts of Law (1912) 35 N. Y. STATE BAR
Ass'N REroRT 885, 892. The court in the instant case admits an unfortunate
and "unjust' result of its narrow interpretation. This result is unnecessary
since the statute provides that amendments may be made at any time with-
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in the trial court's discretion and that the case may be "tried on its real
merits and justice subserved." Md. Code (Bagby, 1924) Art. 75, § 39. The
dissenting opinion reconciles the two sections and arrives at a desirable re-
sult, consistent with the spirit of modern pleading.
SEARCHES AND SEIzuREs-ADSSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED AS AN IN-
CIDENT OF A LAwFUL ARREST.-The defendant was convicted of conspiracy to
violate the Tariff Act and National Prohibition Act. The boatswain of a Coast
Guard patrol, discovering the defendant's motor boat alongside a schooner
twenty-four miles from shore, boarded the motorboat, ordering the defend-
ant and two others to surrender. On board were cases of grain alcohol.
The boatswain arrested the three men, and took them with the boat and
liquor to Boston. The defendant objected to the admission of the boat.
swain's testimony as to %What he discovered on the motorboat at the time
of his command to those on board to surrender. The evidence was admitted.
The Circuit Court of Appeals (one judge dissenting) held this to be error,
the evidence having been obtained by an illegal search and seizure. On
certiorari to the Supreme Court, held that the latter judgment be reversed,
since, if any search was made before reaching port, it was valid as an inci-
dent of a lawful arrest of persons whom the officer had reasonable cause
to believe were engaged in committing a felony. United States v. Lee, 47
Sup. Ct. 746 (1927).
Since prohibition, the federal courts have resorted to extreme measures
to avoid the application of the so-called federal rule making inadmissible
evidence obtained as the result of an illegal search or seizure. See Com-
ment (1927) 36 YALE LAIw JOURNAL 536, 542. Consequently, confusion and un-
certainty as to the proper application of the rule has resulted. See Com-
ment (1927) 36 ibid. 536, 542. Its attempted application has resulted in
a serious interference with the practical workings of prohibition enforce-
ment. See Comment (1927) 36 ibid. 988. Efforts to avoid the rule by
showing that the search and seizure were made "incidental to a lawful ar-
rest" have met with indifferent success. See Comment (1926) 35 ibid. 612.
The court in the instant case reached a proper result, but it would seem
unnecessary to determine whether the search and seizure were legal or il-
legal, so long as they were not unreasonable. See Comment (1927) 36
ibid. 988, 991; see dissenting opinion of Anderson, J. Lee v. United States,
14 F. (2d) 400, 406 (C. C. A. 1st, 1926).
TORTS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-REASONABLE PRECAUTION.-WVhile
the plaintiff was seated in the rear of a third party's automobile, the de-
fendant's agent pumped gasoline into the tank without first removing a
lighted lantern that had been placed near the tank. In an action for in-
juries occasioned by the resulting explosion, judgment was entered for
the plaintiff despite the defendant's contention that the plaintiff's failure
to protest was contributory negligence. Held, on appeal (two judges dis-
senting) that the judgment be affirmed. Underhill v. Major, 220 App. Div.
173, 221 N. Y. Supp. 123 (4th Dept. 1927).
A plaintiff who, by a reasonable exercise of his faculties could have dis-
covered the danger and avoided it, but did not, cannot recover. Nehring V.
Connecticut Co., 86 Conn. 109, 84 At. 301 (1912). Thus, a railroad
worker who, by a use of ordinary care, could have discovered the approach
of a train and avoided the accident is barred by a failure to do so. Chicago,
B. L & P. By. Co. v. Baldwin, 164 Fed. 826 (C. C. A. 8th, 1908). But, an
extraordinary degree of alertness is not required. Campion V. Eakle, 79
Colo. 320, 246 Pac. 280 (1926) (automobile guest held not required to keep
lookout for impending collisions); (1921) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL 101. It
has been held that a plaintiff might recover even though he was not en-
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tirely free from want of caution. Phillips v. Denrer City Tamway Co.,
53 Colo. 458, 128 Pac. 460 (1912) (plaintiff failed to ascertain whether
cars were coming from opposite direction before turning from behind trol-
ley car). Where a plaintiff fails to protest against the continuing careless
conduct of the defendant, his recovery is barred. Harding v. Jesse, 189
Wis. 652, 207 N. W. 706 (1926) (guest in automobile failed to protest
against excessive speed). But in the instant case the plaintiff failed to
protest against careless conduct which at most could only have been antici-
pated. And generally, a plaintiff is not barred for failure to anticipate that
the defendant would act negligently. Clark v. W. I. Lloyd Co., 254 Pa.
168, 98 Atl. 866 (1916) (plaintiff failed to watch as defendant's servant in
backing a wagon negligently turned it so as to strike plaintiff) ; 1 Shearman
& Redfield, Negligence (6th ed. 1913) § 92. Thus, one working on a build-
ing is not barred by failure to anticipate that servants of another contrac-
tor would perform their work negligently. O'Rourke v. Sproul, 241 Ill. 576,
89 N. E. 663 (1909). In view of the rapid succession of events and the
type of accident involved, the instant decision seems justified.
TRAL-EXAMINATION ON VOIR DIRE-EXTENT OF PRIVILEGo.-In an action
for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident, the plaintiff re-
covered a judgment of $2000. On voir dire examination of the jurors, plain-
tiff's counsel asked, over objection, if any of the jurors were "inter-
ested in any way in an insurance company that wrote liability in-
surance." Held, on appeal, that such questions were improper. But, since
the evidence showed clearly that the defendant was at fault, the judgment
was affirmed on condition that the plaintiff file a remittitur of $1000. Camp-
bell v. Polk, 297 S. W. 719 (Mo. 1927).
A wide latitude is usually permitted on voir dire to enable attorneys to
exercise intelligently the privilege of peremptory challenge and challenge
for cause. See Goff v. Kokomo Brass Works, 43 Ind. App. 642, 644-5, 88
N. E. 312, 314 (1909); 2 Elliott, General Practice (1894) § 512; ef. Moore
v. State, 265 S. W. 385 (Tex. Cr. App. 1924) (question as to membership
in Ku Klux Klan); see Note (1925) 19 ILL. L. REV. 601. For this purpose
it is generally held, in an action for personal injuries, that the talesmen
may be interrogated as to their interest in an insurance company. Martin
v. Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 139 Mich. 148, 102 N. W. 65G (1905);
Pearey v. Michigan Mut. Life Ins. Co., 111 Ind. 59, 12 N. E. 98 (1887). But
cf. Tatarsky v. Smith, 242 Pac. 971 (Colo. 1926) (good faith necessary);
Balderson v. Mona ghan, 278 S. W. 783 (Mo. 1925) (insurance com-
pany must actually be interested). It is almost universally held error
to inform the jurors directly that the defendant is insured. Mithen v.
Jeffery, 259 Ill. 372, 102 N. E. 778 (1913); Spinney's Adsz'. v. Hooelcr, 92
Vt. 146, 102 Atl. 53 (1917); Houston Car Wheel Co. v. Smith, 160 S. WN.
435 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913). But see Spoonick v. Backus Brools Co., 89
Minn. 354, 359, 94 N. W. 1079, 1081 (1903) (presumption that jury will
treat all litigants impartially). Reference to the insurance company during
trial is not generally permitted. Ross v. Transfcr Co., 248 Pac. 108 (Or.
1926) (examination of witnesses); Coe v. Van Why, 33 Colo. 315, 80 Pac.
894 (1905) (argument of counsel). In some cases any conveyance of such
information to the talesmen has been held prejudicial error. Lipschutz v.
Ross, 84 N. Y. Supp. 632 (Sup. Ct. 1903); Eckhardt v. Swan Milling Co.,
101 Ill. App. 500 (1902). And persistent intimation of such facts in bad
faith has been held grounds for reversal. Schwa len v. Fullcr & Co., 107
Wash. 476, 182 Pac. 592 (1919). Thus it is possible to bring in matters
in good faith on the voir dire which are inadmissible on examination of
witnesses. See Note (1926) 25 MICH L. REv. 208, 200. But judicial dis-
approval of the use of the voir dire as a part of trial strategy is shown
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in the number of reversals on this score. In recent federal cases the exam-
ination of the jurors has been handled by the judge, counsel being given
opportunity to put questions through the bench. Murphy v. United States,
7 F. (2d). 85 (C. C. A. 1st, 1925) (following Massachusetts practice); of.
Carroll v. United States, 16 F. (2d) 951, 955 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927) (in both
civil and criminal practice); Kurczak v. United States, 14 F. (2d) 109, 110
(C. C. A. 6th, 1926). This would seem a satisfactory solution. The instant
decision seems desirable in that it effects substantial justice while avoiding
the expense and delay of further litigation.
WILLS-SURVIVING SrousE is "HEm.'--The testatrix made a specific be-
quest to her niece, and also provided that part of the remainder of the
entire estate, both real and personal, should go to the niece. In event that
the niece should die before the testatrix, it was provided that the heirs of
the niece should receive the share to which the niece would have been en-
titled. In a suit by the executor of the estate to determine the construction
of the will, the question of whether the husband of the niece was an "heir"
under the will was reserved for the Supreme Court. Held, (one judge
dissenting) that the husband was an "heir" and entitled to a share in his
wife's estate. Hartford Connecticut Trust Co. v. Lawrence, 138 AtI. 159
(Conn. 1927).
At common law, "heirs" were those who inherited real estate in case
of intestacy. 2 EL. Com. *201; Rood, Wills (2d ed. 1926) § 449. In the
absence of a contrary intent of the testator, such an exclusive connotation
was ascribed to the term "heirs" in a will. Nicoll v. Irby, 83 Conn. 530,
77 Atl. 957 (1910) ; Black v. Jones, 264 I1. 548, 106 N. E. 462 (1914) ; Ann.
Cas. 1915D 1178, annotation. A surviving spouse taking only through dower
or curtesy is not an heir in this technical sense. McCarthy v. Walsh, 123
Me. 157, 122 Atl. 406 (1923); Appeal of Dodge, 106 Pa. 216 (1884);
Fidelity & Columbia Trust v. Vogt, 199 Ky. 12, 250 S. W. 486 (1923) ; L. R,
A. 1918A 1110, annotation. However, in those states where the spouse takes
an absolute interest in realty under the statute, on the theory of inheritance,
and not by virtue of the marital relation, he is technically considercd an
heir. Binkley v. Switzer, 75 Colo. 1, 223 Pac. 757 (1924); Lavery v. Egan
143 Mass. 389, 9 N. E. 747 (1887); Brooks v. Parks, 189 Mich. 490, 155
N. W. 573 (1915); Miller v. Miller, 29 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 451 (1906); Page,
Wills (2d Ed. 1926) § 887. Since 1877, dower and curtesy have been
abolished in Connecticut, and the surviving spouse has taken, in the event
of intestacy, an absolute interest in a part of the realty by statute Conn.
Gen. Stat. (1918) § 5055 (Amended 1921, Conn. Pub. Acts 1920-21, c. 221).
In the first decision following this statute, it was held that a husband was
not an "heir" for the purpose of taking his deceased wife's share under a
will. Ruggles v. Randall, 70 Conn. 44, 38 At]. 885 (1897). This view was
followed in the next two cases. Perry v. Bulkley, 82 Conn. 158, 72 At].
1014 (1909) (widow not "heir") ; Hartford Trust Co. v. Purdue, 84 Conn.
256, 79 AtI. 581 (1911) (husband not "heir at law"). In 1918, however,- the
Connecticut court held that a widow was included under the designation
"heirs at law according to the laws of distribution of intestate estates."
Morse v. Ward, 92 Conn. 408, 103 AtL 119 (1918). In 1923, a widow was
held included as an "heir" on very slight evidence of such an intent-
indicating a desire to avoid a strict application of the old technical meaning
of that term. Beach v. Meriden Trust Co., 98 Conn. 821, 120 At. 607
(1923). In reaching their present decision, and practically overruling
earlier cases, the Supreme Court of Connecticut gives support to the pre-
vailing view which places a surviving spouse within the designation of
"heir" where such spouse, by statute, takes an absolute interest in realty
in case of intestacy.
